A spatial reading of urban political-religious conflict : contested urban landscapes in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia by Stockmans, Jep & Büscher, Karen
A spatial reading of urban
political-religious conflict:
contested urban landscapes in
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia*
JEP STOCKMANS AND KAREN BÜSCHER
 Anderson Hall P.O. Box  Gainesville, FL ;
University of Florida/ Universiteitstraat ,  Gent, Belgium;
University of Ghent
Emails: stockmansjep@uﬂ.edu/Karen.Buscher@Ugent.be
A B S T R A C T
This article presents a spatial approach to the recent history of conﬂict and
confrontation between the Ethiopian Government and Ethiopian Muslim
Communities in Addis Ababa. Based on original ethnographic data and inspired
by existing academic studies on political-religious relationships in Addis Ababa,
this study takes a closer look at the signiﬁcance of the urban public landscape
in power-struggles between the EPRDF and the Muslim communities. The
article argues that political-religious struggle in Addis Ababa shapes the current
urban landscape, as use of and control over urban public space and place
forms a crucial element in the strategies of public authority of all involved actors.
I N T R O D U C T I O N
The starting point of this article is the current climate of tension and
confrontation in the capital city of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, between
urban Muslim communities and the Ethiopian government (or the
EPRDF). These relations have not always been as conﬂictual as they
have become since . When the EPRDF took control over Ethiopia
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in , it replaced the Derg regime and announced a total break with
the previous political regime employed by the communist rule and the
previous emperors and Amharic elites. The EPRDF introduced ‘ethnic
and religious freedom’ in its new constitution (Van der Beken )
and for many Ethiopian Muslims, this announced the beginning of a
new era in which they would be freed from what they perceive as centur-
ies of discrimination and treatment as second-class citizens (Hussein
). During the ﬁrst ﬁve years, the EPRDF realised considerable
improvements to the social, political and religious conditions of
Ethiopian Muslims (as well as Christians), especially within the region
of the capital city. A new mayor of Addis Ababa with an Islamic back-
ground assumed power and he intensely reinforced the political and
spatial presence of Islam in town. During his four-year tenure as
mayor, mosques were being constructed, multiple Islamic institutions
were erected and Ethiopian Muslims were allowed to perform religious
rituals in public (Sumeya ). From the second half of the s,
however, mutual perceptions and attitudes between the EPRDF and
the Ethiopian Muslim communities started to change. Increasing fric-
tions emerging from a number of local, regional as well as globally
inﬂuenced dynamics eventually resulted in structural distrust, conﬂict
and (sometimes violent) confrontation. At present, this confrontation
has taken the shape of a sharp opposition, with the government pro-
claiming its ﬁght against Islamic extremism, and the Muslim communi-
ties proclaiming their resistance against government repression and its
interference in religious affairs (Abbink a).
According to Jon Abbink, this controversy between Muslims and the
state ‘is in itself nothing new and reﬂects a pattern of competition and
political claim making well known in Ethiopian history’ (Abbink
a: ). Today’s conﬂictual relationship has to be framed within
broader historical dynamics of political – religious struggle in the
capital city and the country in general (Hussein ; Østebø ;
Feyissa Dori ; Stockmans ). Academic research focusing on
this struggle has analysed the political and socio-economic effects of
these conﬂicts in Addis Ababa in detail (see for example Hussein
; Østebø ; Abbink a). One aspect that has received rela-
tively little attention in these studies is the aspect of space and place;
although some scholars have pointed at spatial outcomes of current
struggle between the Ethiopian government and Ethiopian Muslims,
none have considered the dialectical relationship between the dynamics
of political/religious conﬂict and the dynamics of space/place-making/
unmaking.
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Starting from a concrete urban case study, this article offers a spatial
reading of the on-going conﬂicts between the Ethiopian government
and the Muslim communities in Addis Ababa by focusing on their
spatial strategies of public authority, power and control. By putting particu-
lar focus on ‘spatial agency’, the authors will demonstrate how the urban
public space is used by both actors to reinforce themselves and/or under-
mine the other. We argue that the active shaping and reshaping of
the urban public landscape is an important political mechanism in the
current struggle for control and representation, and that studying the
urban landscape of Addis Ababa is an insightful way to better understand
the ways in which power and authority are produced within the current
setting. In the case of the EPRDF, on the one hand, spatial agency takes
the form of strategies of control, monitoring, curtailing and repressing
Muslim’s claims to the urban space. On the other hand it is exercised by
spatial manipulations making Muslim public space increasingly invisible.
In the case of the Muslim communities, spatial agency is expressed in
their material and immaterial ‘politics of presence’.
This study consists of a historical-political ethnography of the spatialities
of political-religious conﬂicts in Addis Ababa. Since many of the recent
frictions and conﬂicts between the Ethiopian Muslim-communities and
the EPRDF unfold themselves in the urban context, the choice for an
urban case-study approach is a straightforward one. Addis Ababa presents
a perfect case given its particular political history and the historical
inﬂuence of religious actors on shaping local urban society. This paper
is based on a thorough literature review, combined with ﬁrst-hand data
collected during ethnographic ﬁeldwork in Addis Ababa between
January–March . Apart from gathering information through qualita-
tive researchmethods such as in-depth interviews and participant observa-
tion with various groups of informants, secondary resources were also
actively consulted, including local archives, local newspapers, government
documents, blog posts, satellite images and maps. Ethiopian Muslims,
from different movements, formed the main group of informants for
this research (academics, journalists, street vendors, etc.), although
many interviews were also held with non-Muslim urban inhabitants,
local administrative authorities and government representatives.
After situating our topic within the relevant theoretical frameworks
and academic debates, we present a short historical reconstruction of
the complex relationship between the Ethiopian government and the
Muslim communities of Addis Ababa. Subsequently, we investigate the
spatial aspects of current confrontations and analyse the role and func-
tion of urban public space in the dynamics of (violent) power struggle.
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O N L A N D S C A P E S O F R E L I G I O N A N D T H E P O L I T I C S O F
S P A T I A L A G E N C Y
The spatial turn in political science and conﬂict studies has taught us
how to apply space as an analytical tool in the analysis of political strug-
gle. By understanding space and place as tools of political power or
agency, we have been able to observe how power circulates through
space and (urban) landscapes. The speciﬁc spatial patterns or dimen-
sions of political-religious conﬂict in Ethiopia have been touched
upon by a number of scholars working on Addis Ababa (Desplat ;
Abbink ; Feyissa Dori ). This study is particularly inspired by
the fascinating work of Patrick Desplat (; Desplat & Schulz )
on mechanisms of place-making by Ethiopian Muslim communities,
being the ﬁrst scholar to use a speciﬁc urban approach in this
domain. However, where Desplat exclusively focuses on Muslim
agency in terms of place-making, our study investigates the function of
urban public space in spatial agency on both sides in conﬂict, thus
also including the Ethiopian government (EPRDF). The Ethiopian
regime is equally engaged in spatial interventions and manipulation of
the public material and political cityscape, by for example pushing reli-
gious infrastructures such as mosques to the urban periphery. The
speciﬁc case-study of struggles over material and political urban space
in Addis Ababa demonstrates the mechanisms of spatial modes of
urban governance. In line with political geographer Doreen Massey’s
interpretation of spatial agency and the relationship between transform-
ation of space and management of power, we will argue that the use and
transformation of public space is part of the political mechanisms of
power and control (Massey ; Büscher ). As such, the struggles
over urban public space in Addis Ababa are analysed here as an outcome
of the ‘politics of spatial agency’ (Sadeh ). This spatial agency lies
in the practices that create, reconﬁgure or undermine the public space,
in the actors that plan them, the laws that legitimise them and the dis-
courses that shape them.
Different scholars have elaborated on the geographies of religion and
the religious production of space in which the case of the struggle
between the Muslim communities of Addis Ababa and EPRDF can be
situated (Kong , ; Holloway & Valins ; Gale ). This
spatial analysis of religion has demonstrated the critical importance of
‘locations in which religion resides’ (Olson et al. : ): the individual,
institutions, objects, mosques, public media and more. The material
urban spaces such as mosques, or public religious practices such as
 J E P S T O C K M A N S A N D K A R E N B Ü S C H E R
available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X1600077X
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. Universiteit Gent, on 08 Mar 2017 at 08:45:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
wearing a veil in public, are both crucial in daily routines of the Muslim
communities in Addis Ababa, at the same time symbolising the commu-
nities’ presence, representation and power in town. It is crucial to
understand how the religious production of space often is in itself a pol-
itical act (Garmany ); Ethiopia is a clear example of how the pres-
ence and growth of Islam has become a very political debate. What the
case of Addis Ababa will further illustrate is how the politics of religion
are spatially translated (Gale & Naylor ; Desplat & Schulz ).
Arguing that spatial agency is a political practice helps us to understand
the current events in Addis Ababa where the relation between politics
and religious space has been creating, transforming and pulling apart
urban space and place.
Cities do not only present ultimate arenas of political contest, but also
represent extended variations of public space in terms of physical infra-
structure or media, for example (Büscher ). In Ethiopia, Addis
Ababa – with its well-developed government infrastructures, security
forces and religious institutions – represents a unique arena of religious
mobilisation and statehood. As the capital city, and the largest city in
Ethiopia, Addis Ababa embodies a fascinating concentration of multiple
cultures, identities, ethnicities and languages. As is the case for capital
cities worldwide, it is here that political struggles are fought; it is in
the capital city that government as well as religious institutions are
most visible and their mechanisms of presence, dominance and author-
ity the most pronounced. In their urban context, religious urban spaces
and places matter politically, economically and socially. Researchers
such as Desplat have clearly indicated that economic, social and political
activities in and around religious spaces are important to consider in an
analysis of space-making in cities such as Addis Ababa; further, as he
states, ‘Muslim practices of place making are often intensiﬁed to man-
oeuvre through the complexities of urban life’ (Desplat in Desplat &
Schulz : ).
I N C R E A S I N G C O N F R O N T A T I O N S B E T W E E N E P R D F A N D E T H I O P I A N
M U S L I M C O M M U N I T I E S I N A D D I S A B A B A
Around % of the present Ethiopian population is Muslim. The
Ethiopian Muslim communities consist of a range of movements, all
very different with regards to ideology and practice. In Addis Ababa,
the four largest Islamic movements are: () the Salaﬁst movement (in
Addis Ababa mainly represented by the Ethiopian Muslim Youth
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Association) which is currently perceived by many as a more ‘radical’
movement; () the Suﬁsm-inspired Jamat al-Tabligh movement (the
biggest in Ethiopia); () the Intellectualist Movement which has its
origins in the ideas of a collection of Islamist movements (including
the Muslim Brotherhood); and () Al-Abbash, the government-
promoted ‘moderate’ Islamic movement (Østebø , ; Abbink
a). The Muslim population of Addis Ababa is generally linked
to certain areas and neighbourhoods in town. Muslims living close to
one another often try to construct local institutions like mosques and
schools, representing important centres around which their daily life
is organised (Masud ). These areas do not form homogeneous
blocks and they can be internally quite fragmented. The way in which
different groups of Ethiopian Muslims engage with the public space in
Addis Ababa can be different, given the fact that they historically
occurred in different spatial and cultural contexts within Ethiopia
(Østebø ).
With regard to Muslim settlements in Addis Ababa – following pat-
terns of migration – Muslim communities tend to be strongly repre-
sented in particular urban neighbourhoods (Abdulwehab ).
The sub-cities or boroughs of Addis Ababa: Addis Katema, Kolfe
Keranyo, Gulele and Lafto, are generally known to be places with the
highest Muslim concentrations and a signiﬁcant number of mosques
or Muslim-dominant markets. Only Addis Ketama is located in the
centre of the city; in this sub-city one ﬁnds the Muslim-dominated
market Merkato. The other sub-cities are closer to the periphery of
Addis Ababa, since they were added later in the urban planning. The
ideological correlation between the different Muslim communities
and these sub-cities is not straightforward as they present a ‘scrambled’
presence of Muslims from different movements. Yet, some areas such as
Gulele are commonly perceived as dominantly Tablighi given their his-
torical presence.
All Islamic movements blossomed in Ethiopia during the early reign
of the EPRDF, in particular the Salaﬁst movement saw a spectacular
growth, no longer faced with restrictions with regards to its activities
and exchanges with Saudi Arabia. The regime’s initial support to
the Muslim communities in an attempt to curb the power of the
(mainly Christian) Amharic elites resulted in a big expansion of
Muslim religious education, media and culture. Muslims occupied
more prominent political and governmental positions. Islamic NGOs,
associations and institutions were erected, Friday public ofﬁce hours
were adapted to the mosque prayer-times (Abbink ), and in 
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a local scholar noted that  of the existing  mosques in Addis
Ababa had been built after the EPRDF took power in  (Sumeya
). However, the image of the EPRDF as an allegedly ‘pro-Muslim
party’ that emerged from this support did not survive long. Today,
relationships between the EPRDF and Islamic movements in Addis
Ababa are characterised by deep distrust, sharpened by the govern-
ments’ current battle against Islamic ‘radicalisation’.
Since the mid s, a number of incidents have marked this deteri-
orating relationship. Østebø (), Feyissa Dori () and Abbink
(a) have described in detail these moments that are locally and
internationally perceived as fundamental in the changing attitude of
the EPRDF and the changing discourse on Islam in Ethiopia. Many
Muslim demonstrations and confrontations with the government
occurred around the contestation over the Majlis (or Ethiopian
Islamic Affairs Supreme Council, EIASC), the only government-
supported organ for Ethiopian Islamic socio-political representation
and protection in Addis Ababa. The regime has increasingly tried to
co-opt this institution, leading to a gradual loss of its legitimacy in the
eyes of the Muslim communities. From  onwards, through the
body of the Majlis, the Ethiopian government started organising train-
ings and ‘reformist’ conferences in Addis Ababa aiming at more ‘mod-
eration and religious tolerance’ (Abbink a) by explicitly promoting
the al-Ahbash movement (and, by extension, denouncing Salaﬁsm in
Ethiopia which was considered both by the government and the al-
Ahbash movement as extremist). By promoting this regime-controlled
form of Islam through ideological training sessions, the government
used an ultimate strategy of control to regain power over the Muslim
communities (Østebø ; Abbink a). This al-Ahbash ‘indoc-
trination’ was answered with a structural urban-based resistance and
wave of demonstrations by the different Muslim-communities who col-
lectively turned their back against EPRDF. The co-optation of the
Majlis also resulted in an increasing informal organisation of Islamic
associations, escaping the control of the central government (Østebø
).
The wave of conﬂicts and confrontations since  between the
Muslim communities of Addis Ababa and the Ethiopian Government
can be read as state repression of Muslim activism; the government
itself has framed these efforts as ‘tackling Islamic extremist discourse
and practices’. Muslim communities however, have experienced this
as a threat to their religious freedom. In their ﬁght against what
EPRDF perceived as ‘radicalisation tendencies’, the government took
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different, similarly contested actions to secure its control over the com-
munities. A clear tendency through these actions can be observed in the
repression of the Salaﬁst movement. The most explicit example is the
government ‘cleansing’ of the Salaﬁst Aweliya College (and by extension
the Aweliya Mosque) in Addis Ababa by putting it under Majlis jurisdic-
tion, dismissing ﬁfty staff members (including all Arabic teachers) and
abolishing the Arabic curriculum. In response, student protests broke
out from the Aweliya College, massively supported by a large part of the
urban Muslim communities, reinforced on social media, against al-
Ahbash and the Ethiopian government.
M O S Q U E S , N E W S P A P E R S , A N D V E I L S I N A D D I S A B A B A :
C O N T E S T E D C L A I M S O N U R B A N P H Y S I C A L , V I S U A L A N D
P O L I T I C A L P U B L I C S P A C E
Just like many African cities today, Addis Ababa, with its estimated ·
million inhabitants, is characterised by a rapid demographic and geo-
graphic expansion (Addis Ababa is  times bigger than the second
largest Ethiopian city). A largely informal urban economy is an answer
to huge formal unemployment (Di Nunzio ). The urban landscape
is further marked by large areas of informal settlements as well as
several on-going slum-upgrading projects as well as neo-liberal urban
developments. The Ethiopian regime is ever present in public urban
life in the form of the police force, the large military base in the midst
of the city, the strong centralisation of its administration, and tight
control on organisational life. Furthermore, the government is visually
present in the public space through billboards with nationalist propa-
ganda and several important open squares which are decorated with
party banners and ﬂags. An example is Meskel Square, the ultimate
place of public gatherings in Addis Ababa where the life of the ﬁrst
EPRDF prime Minister Meles Zenawi is remembered extensively. In
general, it has further been observed that the Ethiopian state has
increasingly narrowed the space for public engagement of civil society,
opposition parties and – to some extent – the private sector (Planel &
Bridonneau ).
Religion is very present in the public sphere of Addis Ababa and func-
tions as a ‘key framework for community life’ (Abbink ). Public
space in Addis Ababa, as in other urban centres of Ethiopia, is marked
by inter-religious competition over the public space. This is often literally
translated into competition over when and where to build mosques,
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churches or chapels; self-presentation in the media; public celebrations;
and religious ‘noise’ production by means of loudspeakers (Abbink
). In our attempt to describe how the power games between the
Ethiopian government and the urban Muslim communities are fought
out in terms of urban spaces and places, we will similarly approach
Addis Ababa’s public space from two different angles: on the one
hand we will focus on the ‘hardware’ – the material urban landscape
mainly in the form of religious infrastructure; on the other hand we
will focus on the ‘software’ or the claims to the political public space
in the form of public demonstrations, media proﬁling and religious
public practices and performances.
Different movements within the Muslim community have their own
particularities engaging in the public space. For example, more than
any other movement, the Intellectualist Movement is intrinsically
‘urban’ in nature, ‘home grown’ in Addis Ababa and led mainly by edu-
cated youth. Their engagement with politics is more explicit than other
movements, notably in contrast with Jamat al Tabligh, who tend more to
avoid political debates. Since, according to the Intellectualist Movement,
Muslims are expected to be engaged in all sectors of social and political
life (Østebø ), this movement is often well represented in urban
protest movements, making explicit political claims on social media,
publications and grafﬁti. While the Intellectualist Movement has the uni-
versity as its urban spatial base, for the Salaﬁst movement, this base is
much more the mosque, or for the Tabligh the bases can be found in
the trading centres around Merkato Market. With regards to religious
education, audio and video material, or dress-codes, many public
debates revolve around the Salaﬁ dominance, which can be partly
explained by the increasing political attention towards this particular
movement. With regards to their spatial visibility, for example, the
Salaﬁ garb makes them very distinguishable in the public sphere.
Some Salaﬁ women will wear the Niqab while many other Muslim
women will wear the hijab. Similarly, some Salaﬁ men often distinguish
themselves by their beards and pants that show their ankles, while
other Muslims will wear the Thawb or white dress more regularly.
Legal battles to construct a mosque
Mosques, Islamic schools and shrines are often metaphors of represen-
tation and prominence. They function as spatial signatures of Muslim
presence in the city and are an important element in Muslim’s spatial
politics of presence. Furthermore, much of these mosques’ actual
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signiﬁcance in people’s daily lives results from the social actions of
people ‘who imbue the physical structure of a locality with speciﬁc
meanings and functions’ (Desplat & Schulz : ). Thus, apart
from the material manifestation of urban religious infrastructure, it is
also important to pay attention to the daily routines and activities of
the people surrounding these places. We might point, for example, to
the numerous Muslim shopkeepers operating around mosques, and
other daily practices of ‘place-making’ by ordinary citizens.
When looking for mosques in Addis Ababa, one needs to look beyond
the restricted image of classic domes and minarets. Most of the time,
mosques take the form of regular houses and are often part of private
property. This can partly be explained by complex procedures to be
granted land titles or formal construction permits, procedures which
are often corrupted or partly informal. Locally, this is also repeatedly
explained, mainly by Muslims, by the fact that the government allegedly
hinders the construction of mosques in the capital city (Abdellah ;
Abdulwehab ; Sumeya ). This forces several mosques to
operate informally, without any licence, from the outside almost unrec-
ognisable (Sumeya ). In , only  out of mosques in Addis
Ababa were ofﬁcially registered and were operating with a formal
licence. From the interviews with different respondents in Addis
Ababa, the refusal of providing licences for Ethiopian mosques in
Addis Ababa is perceived as an active strategy of the government, legit-
imising possible future legal actions in order to shut down these religious
institutions. In case the EPRDF were to change their mind on a plot of
land (for purposes of urban planning or developmental agendas) this
could provide legal grounds for removing mosques operating without
any legal framework. The consequence of forcing these institutions
to operate informally is a total lack of legal protection for the structures
that are used as mosques. Moreover, since they are not ofﬁcially recog-
nised as mosques in the ﬁrst place, from the government’s position
these (informal) constructions are not legally mosques to begin with.
As such, the prayer in general and more importantly Friday prayer
cannot be ofﬁcially organised in these mosques, and the government
thus forces Muslims to operate informally, curtailing their material
and visible presence in the urban landscape. To give another
example: only  of the  mosques constructed since  were
given a plot of land to construct their mosque by the government
(Abdellah ). According to an employee at the municipality of
Addis Ababa, there are no plots of land foreseen in the current city plan-
ning for the construction of religious buildings in Addis Ababa. Whoever
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wants to construct a religious institution in Addis Ababa should intro-
duce a demand for construction at the municipal level, the government
will accord the land after investigation. The Ethiopian government, by
intervening in construction plans for mosques, deliberately hinders the
spatial presence and expansion of Muslim communities in Addis Ababa.
The EPRDF obstructs their spatial agency by instrumentalising legal pro-
cedures of allocation of land (by granting permissions, taking back per-
missions, or granting permissions to several applicants for the same
plot). Although this has never been ofﬁcially conﬁrmed by the govern-
ment, this tenure insecurity is generally understood as a complex mech-
anism used by the regime to conﬁrm their control over the cityscape and
to weaken Muslim claims to it. Interestingly, the outcome of the gov-
ernment-driven de-institutionalisation of Islam has been the increased
importance of mosques as crucial bases of religious recruitment by
Muslim communities. Yet, this fragmentation of spatial anchoring of
Islam in the urban social and political landscape poses serious chal-
lenges to the Ethiopian government, as scattered mosques are much
more difﬁcult to ‘control’ then a centralised institution (Østebø ).
Another interpretation for the regime’s motivations behind these
mechanisms has been the EPRDF’s consistent efforts to present itself
as a secular state, in which religion is reduced to the private sphere
(Østebø ). However, since the EPRDF has been in power and has
constituted religious freedom, the opposite has been observed, in the
form of an increase in religious public presence (Stockmans ).
Constructing new mosques has proved to be a long and complex
procedure, frequently involving conﬂict. This is well illustrated by the
often-heard expressions among Muslims in Addis Ababa such as ‘for
the construction of every mosque blood has to ﬂow’ or ‘for every
mosque someone has to die’. This, of course, is exaggerated; the gov-
ernment in some cases does support the Muslim communities in their
spatial expansion. However, it cannot be ignored that a large number
of mosques in Addis Ababa were only built after long and exhaustive
legal battles with government bodies responsible for granting the plots
of land, issuing the necessary title deeds and permits for construction
(Abdulwehab ). Some examples are very illustrative in this regard.
In , the local Muslim committee wishing to construct the Bilal
mosque introduced a demand at the municipality for permission to con-
struct on a plot of land in the western part of Addis Ababa (Addis
Ketama). They were left to wait for several years and in the meantime
a small temporary mosque was erected. When in  the government
eventually replied, the land turned out to have been sold in the
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meantime, to a private investor. The community was told that the tem-
porary mosque had to be destroyed within ﬁve days, if not a demolition
crew would be send by the government. In response, the local Muslim
community demonstrated against this decision. Eventually, in ,
the government gave in to the pressure and demands, and granted
the land for the construction of Bilal mosque. The construction was
ﬁnalised in ,  years after the initial request for permission
(Sumeya ).
Another similar example is that of al-Fatih mosque, for which the local
Muslim community had to wait  years for a construction permit. As was
the case for the Bilal mosque, while the request was pending, the land
had been sold by the government to a private investor. The temporary
mosque, which was built out of frustration after several years of
waiting, was to be demolished and the community had to pay a
, Birr ﬁne based on illegal construction. Today it has been
rebuilt on another piece of land with permission of the Ethiopian gov-
ernment (Abdulwehab ).
Finally, there is the long history of Sumeia mosque. The ﬁrst efforts to
construct the mosque in , under the Derg regime, were violently
obstructed by the government. The scholar that instigated the applica-
tion for a construction permit in  was arrested and served a sen-
tence in prison. His son, who later took over the campaign to build
the mosque, disappeared in  and was never seen again. In ,
the new regime agreed to the construction, yet no formal consent was
given. The government contacted the community and through a letter
conﬁrmed the approval of their construction permit. However, the
permit itself was never actually produced and granted to the commu-
nity. In , it was announced that the plot requested to construct
the mosque had been allocated for the construction of a private
school. In  a new request was introduced and in the meantime, a
private house was rented that would serve as a temporary mosque.
However, the moment the Christian owner became aware of the
Muslim activities on his property, he ordered them to leave. The com-
munity refused and occupied the house for almost two years until the
government forcefully intervened, leaving ﬁve dead and  injured
(Abdellah ; Abdulwehab ). Shortly after this incident, the
government allocated a different area in the city for the construction
of Sumeia mosque. However, as turns out is often the case, this plot
was located in a former rubbish dump in the borough of Yeka. Fetah
Abdellah, who has done research on this phenomenon, states that
% of the mosques in Addis Ababa have been constructed near a
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gorge or a place that used to function as a rubbish dump (Abdulwehab
). A number of scholars who have done research on the history of
mosques in Addis Ababa claim that there is an active policy within the
Ethiopian government to locate mosques in Addis Ababa on pieces of
land which are not suitable, to avoid large concentrations of mosques
in the city centre (Abdellah ; Abdulwehab ; Sumeya ).
By allocating plots in the urban periphery and by dragging out the
process for acquiring formal licences, permits and titles, the government
regularly leaves mosques in a marginal and informal position in Addis
Ababa. Mosques, that are intended to be physical reminders of a reli-
gious presence, power and visibility, thus become invisible and unrecog-
nisable in the form of hidden, informal prayer rooms in regular houses.
If the Muslim communities react by making these informal mosques
more ‘visible’ (by spatial and vocal performances, for example), their
informal position and tenure insecurity makes them extremely vulner-
able to government interventions and expulsion on the basis of
‘illegal’ status. Studies on informal processes of urbanisation in other
cases in urban Africa have demonstrated that corrupt practices of land
regulation are an important element of urban elites’ strategies of dom-
inance and power (Locatelli & Nugent ). The politics of land allo-
cation are being used in many African cities to exclude or marginalise
potential threats to the dominant public authority, and are one of the
most effective tools to deﬁne who has a ‘right to the city’ and who
does not (Mabin ; Jenkins ). Further, from these examples
also emerges how the material attempts to claim the public space are
pushed back by the Ethiopian government in the name of urban devel-
opment, by allowing private actors (companies, development agencies,
private schools) to access land that is requested by the religious commu-
nity. As has been demonstrated by a number of scholars, through the
logic of the ‘developmental state’, the facilitation of neo-liberal private
urban development is an integral part of the EPRDF strategies of state
formation and reinforcing legitimacy for the authoritarian state
(Lefort ).
Claiming the urban public space by ritual practices and performance
The Friday prayer is the most prominent demonstration of the presence
of the urban Muslim communities in Addis Ababa’s cityscape. At the
Friday communal prayer, Muslims gather in and around the larger
mosques in town that have the capacity to host large numbers of
people. But this space is often not large enough, and the obvious
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shortage of mosques in the city to host all Addis Ababa Muslims leads at
times to hundreds of Muslims gathering in the streets around these
mosques to perform the prayer (Stockmans ). In such places as
the Beni Mosque, located close to Merkato, the overﬂow of Muslims
during prayer time is extensive; the streets surrounding the mosque
are completely ﬁlled with prayer rugs from sidewalk to sidewalk. All sur-
rounding streets are cut off because there is literally no sign of the
asphalt road underneath the prayer rugs. The two streets surrounding
the Beni Mosque, including the roundabout in which these streets
end, are completely occupied. A third road also ending at this round-
about is partially used by people who arrived late to the call to prayer
from the Beni mosque. Before Friday prayer takes place there is the
extensive performance of ablutions (al-Wudu) which is also done in
the streets due to lack of inside infrastructure. After the Friday prayer
is performed it takes about an hour for everyone to clear out of the
mosque and its surrounding public space. During the prayer, the govern-
ment usually closes off the street. These prayers are accompanied by an
extensive police presence deployed by the state, ostensibly because the
total occupation of the streets requires police to monitor trafﬁc, but a
presence which is locally interpreted as a way for the government to
closely monitor the Friday prayer.
Not only the police, but also non-Muslim urban inhabitants, increas-
ingly display irritation at Muslim public praying in the streets. There
are reported incidents in which Muslims who were praying in public
spaces were chased away by police, or harassed by other citizens
(Abdellah ). During the construction of Jafar mosque, for
example, there was an incident during which local Muslims praying
on a stretch of grass in anticipation of the mosque were called ‘dogs’
and ‘foreigners’ by bystanders (Abdulwehab ). Another case
where taxi drivers decided to pray next to their cab under one of the
Addis Ababa bridges resulted in them being chased away by the
police. This growing frustration with public prayers is locally explained
by the increasing sense of suspicion towards Muslim presence and prac-
tices in Addis Ababa, reinforced by local media representations of Islam
in relation to extremism and terrorism.
Prior to the fall of the Derg and the arrival of the new Ethiopian
regime, Muslims were only allowed very restricted ritual expression,
not only in terms of public prayers and but also in terms of expression
through clothing and ritual performance. Before , it was rare in
Addis Ababa to see Muslims praying in the streets or wearing traditional
Muslim dress. Today Ethiopian Muslims are visibly present in the urban
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public space. Women wearing theHijab and some Salaﬁ women wearing
the Niqab increase the visibility of Islam in the public space, providing
striking contrasts with the dominant historical presentation of
Ethiopia as a ‘Christian nation’. After the liberalization of religion in
 there was a huge increase in Islamic religious garb. Women in par-
ticular have returned to the use of veiling, in the context of new access to
global Islamic discourses resulting from this liberalization (Østebø
). The extensive use of the veil after  is an interesting phenom-
enon, whose expansion can largely be explained by a new emphasis on
piousness by reform movements like Salaﬁsm. However, the donning of
the veil is accepted and even required by most interpretations of Sunni
Islam and is thus often presented as an effort by women to be pious and
respected Muslims.
This effort to claim the urban space in the form of increasing public
presence and visibility has been met with various responses. In  the
EPRDF introduced a law prohibiting the headscarf for women, and
prayer on the campuses of schools and universities. Bahir Dar
University, for example, has prohibited the hijab and niqab since .
The law is justiﬁed in terms of the notion of the secular state and the sep-
aration of education and religion, as provided for in the  constitu-
tion. Yet, as is constantly pointed out in Muslim protests, many Ethiopian
Muslims experience this as a violation of the notion of freedom of reli-
gious expression which is equally spelled out in the constitution.
Struggle over the political urban space
As the capital city, Addis Ababa represents the ultimate administrative
and political centre of the country, in which the state presence and
inﬂuence is at its strongest. Logically, the capital city thus is ultimately
an arena where political discourses are produced and reproduced by
the regime as well as by religious institutions. The public expression of
religion has become a political debate in different ways. First of all, it
challenges the dominant state narratives of secularism in Ethiopia.
Secondly, in the light of the post / political landscape, debates on
the Islamic presence and spatial (as well as social and economic) expan-
sion is more politicised than ever. Finally, faith has become an increasing
political resource in Addis Ababa and Ethiopia in general, where polit-
ical opposition has actively capitalised upon faith-based anti-government
sentiments.
Contestation over political space in Addis Ababa is well illustrated by
the case of public demonstrations. Demonstrations led by the Ethiopian
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Muslim communities in the city of Addis Ababa are nothing new. As was
also the case during the Derg regime, demonstrations have been used by
the different Muslim communities as an important means to put forward
their demands toward – and critiques against – the Ethiopian govern-
ment. Over the last  years, the pressure to export religious demands
to the public space was met with increasing controversy and resistance
(Abbink a). The impact on the urban public space is obvious:
large numbers of Muslims gather in the streets, marching, singing and
shouting, making it impossible to ignore them. This form of Muslim pol-
itical agency as such is also a form of claiming space, not only to put pres-
sure on the government but also to make other urban inhabitants aware
of their problems and frustrations. As mentioned earlier, younger
Muslim generations are today much more involved in politics, and
follow different, more political versions of Islam. The growing urban
based, wealthy middle class of politically active Muslims (such as many
in the intellectualist movement) has a strong inﬂuence on the contest-
ation over political public space between the state and the Muslim
communities.
The protest movements, such as those that emerged after the Aweliya
incidents, gather different Muslim factions, although the Salaﬁst move-
ment is often explicitly present given the fact that it feels particularly tar-
geted by government policies. The Aweliya incidents were followed by
two years of regular mass demonstrations, supported by parts of the
Christian communities and opposition groups. The Muslim communi-
ties formulated three demands: the return of the college ‘to the
people’, elections for the Majlis (eventually accepted by the govern-
ment) and a halt to the enforced indoctrination of al-Ahbash (Jawar
et al. ; Østebø ). The demonstrations grew into a broad
Muslim protest movement against the increasingly intrusive approach
to Islam of the government. This ‘movement’ was mainly organised by
the so-called ‘arbitration committee’ representing a broad spectrum
of the different Muslim communities (Østebø & Shemsedin ). As
elsewhere in Africa and all over the world, these political demonstrations
are a clear urban phenomenon. They usually take place in the centre of
the city around Anwar mosque (the most important mosque in Addis
Ababa, located within the Merkato market in the sub-city Addis
Ketama). These demonstrations were often met with ﬁerce repression
by the army and police, and the arrests of many protesters and represen-
tatives of the movement (Jawar et al. ) led to a gradual decline in
the weekly demonstrations after two years. Yet, the movement is still
very active on social media, and sporadically calls for demonstrations.
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As such, in a way, the spatial agency in the form of political demonstra-
tions has been partly ‘relocated’ from the streets to the internet.
The passing of a controversial anti-terror law in  has further
enabled the Ethiopian government to crack down on any movement
against the regime, whether religious or politically motivated (Østebø
). Demonstrators can be arrested at any time for ‘inciting terror
and instability’. On  July , the Ethiopian Federal High Court con-
victed a number of leaders of the Ethiopian Muslim protest movement
under the controversial Anti-Terror law, on charges of terrorism and
conspiracy to ‘create an Islamic state’ in Ethiopia. Two journalists, 
activists and six members of the Ethiopian Arbitration Committee
received sentences ranging from seven to  years of prison. This
trial again led to demonstrations and was portrayed by some as a
‘political spectacle designed to conceal the regime’s re-indoctrination
campaign and silence long-standing grievances of the Muslim popula-
tion’. Interpreting this government legal action towards Muslim acti-
vists as part of an EPRDF strategy to delegitimise protest and silence
certain journalists, activists and opposition leaders is no surprise, given
the explicit political character these demonstrations and the govern-
ment responses have acquired.
A ﬁnal example of spatial expressions of political conﬂict between
Ethiopian government and Muslim communities in Addis Ababa, is
the latter’s strategy of anti-government grafﬁti in Addis Ababa’s public
place. These are often only temporary, since they are frequently imme-
diately removed by the EPRDF. Yet this silent but very visible way of
urban protest, by which city walls display messages such as ‘respect to the
constitution’ and ‘respond to our request’, has emerged as an original mech-
anism used by urban Muslim communities (especially the Intellectualist
Movement) to claim public space.
Media as a tool for constructing and deconstructing power and legitimacy
In their power struggle, both the government and religious communi-
ties – Muslims as well as Christians – actively use media as a political
tool. Abbink () notes that this use of social and other media has
fueled political tensions and has sharpened the polemics. The media
landscape of Addis Ababa in the form of newspapers, broadcasting,
Facebook, DVDs and YouTube has become the scene of extreme anti-
government as well as anti-Islam images and discourses.
When in  steps were taken by the EPRDF to guarantee religious
freedom in Ethiopia, the initiatives opened opportunities for alternative
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and religiously inspired media channels. All Ethiopian religious groups
quickly began to produce new magazines and newspapers as well as
(more recently) blogs and other forms of social media. Through these
different channels, the Muslim communities express their religious,
social and political claims to their rights and their position in
Ethiopian society. As mentioned above, some Muslim communities are
more prominently present in the media, and some groups are more
explicitly political in their use of media, than others. For example, the
publications of the Salaﬁ and Tablighi movement will usually not
engage in political matters but rather focus more on Da’wa (teaching
the ‘correct’ form of Islam) and piousness (Østebø & Shemsedin
). The only Muslim movement in Addis Ababa that is known for
its emphasis on politics is the Intellectualist movement.
Especially since the structural protests began in , several blog
sites have emerged to attack the government’s repressive actions
against Muslim communities. The comments by one blogger provide
a typical example:
We face a big bureaucratic challenge whenever we demand to build our
mosques. Our children couldn’t express their faith freely in government
owned colleges and universities. Muslim charity organisations are falsely
accused of expanding ‘Wahhabism’ and closed down. The leadership of
the Majlis didn’t say anything when these illegal measures were hurting
the Muslim society, pointing to the Higher Council of Islamic Affairs in
Ethiopia.
From the mid-s onwards, the Ethiopian government has increas-
ingly intervened to close down Islamic media channels (Østebø ;
Abbink ; Feyissa Dori ). Islamic periodicals are regularly cen-
sored by the government. These periodicals, distributed not only in
Islamic institutes but also in shops, restaurants and elsewhere, are an
important asset for the Muslim communities to shape their identity
and public positions. In  only eight Islamic periodicals remained
of the several dozen that emerged after . By  this number had
been reduced to four (Salaﬁyah, al-Islam, Sawtul Islam and Quddis), and
by  they had all disappeared. After the escalation of the al-Ahbash
and Aweliya incidents in  the government cracked down on local
Islamic production houses. They raided the privately owned Horizon
press, which printed periodicals like Salaﬁyah and Sawtul Islam. The
editor of the periodical Muslim Affairs was arrested together with the
owner of Horizon press and two journalists went into hiding (Abbink
b). Other examples are the prohibition of television programmes,
usually from Sudan or Egypt; Africa TV based in Sudan is prohibited
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from broadcasting in Ethiopia, however due to satellite TV it is close to
impossible for the government to control their broadcast. The Muslim
communities in Addis Ababa argue that these actions contradict the
freedom of religious expression and freedom of media as guaranteed
in the Ethiopian constitution. It is important to note, however, that
it is not only Islamic media that has suffered from censorship. Other reli-
gious periodicals and newspapers fromOrthodox and Pentecostal origin
have disappeared over the past two decades (Abbink ), justiﬁed as
efforts to ‘secure the secular values’ of the Ethiopian state.
EPRDF, in its evolution towards a semi-authoritarian regime, has
increasingly sought to control public information channels (internet,
telephone) and media in general. When critically studying the most
prominent discourses presented on the government-owned media chan-
nels, it cannot be denied that the topic of Islamic extremism and the
threat of Islam in the Horn of Africa has received more and more
media coverage. Through the EPRDF-owned newspapers and television
channels, the role and responsibility of the Ethiopian government to
combat this threat is continuously stressed.
In the wake of the Aweliya incidents, the EPRDF distributed the docu-
mentary ‘Jihadawi Harekat’ (Jihadi movement, subtitled: Boko Haram
in Ethiopia). One of the main claims of this documentary is the link
between Ethiopian Islamic movements (such as the Salaﬁ movement)
to extremist groups all over Africa and the Mashrek. For example, it
draws parallels between the Ethiopian Muslim civil rights movement
(that originated from the Aweliya incident) and Islamic jihadist
groups such as Boko Haram and al-Shabaab. The broadcast of this docu-
mentary strongly discredited the initial peaceful protest movement that
had emerged around Aweliya College. However, this documentary was
soon perceived by most Ethiopians (Muslims as well as Christians) as a
clear example of propaganda, and it eventually backﬁred on the govern-
ment. The documentary lost all credibility after various facts were leaked
to the public, demonstrating that much of it had been intentionally
orchestrated to delegitimise the Muslim Aweliya demonstrators.
Eventually, a coalition of  (of the national total of ) political
parties denounced the documentary as an orchestrated exaggeration
of the facts to serve EPRDF propaganda and to justify the government’s
rude crackdown of the Muslim civil rights movement (Jawar et al. ).
Thus apart from reacting to the public religious media presence by
curtailing and censoring Muslim media channels, the Ethiopian
regime also actively engaged in the production and reproduction of a
counter-discourse, from portraying Muslim communities as ‘extremist’
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and ‘radical’, to castigate what the Ethiopian government understands
under Islamic extremism, namely movements like Salaﬁsm and The
Muslim brotherhood,, inspired by the post / discourse of the ‘war
on terror’.
C O N C L U D I N G R E M A R K S
The case of Addis Ababa perfectly illustrates the thesis that ‘urban space
is the product of conﬂict’ (Massey : ). Political conﬂict between
the government and the Muslim communities can be read from the
urban landscape of Ethiopia’s capital city. Conﬂicts over constructing
and legalising mosques, public prayers and producing media discourse
are the material outcomes of a complex struggle over public authority
with historical roots in Ethiopia.
As this article has demonstrated, both parties engage in spatial
mechanisms of presence and control. For the case of the Muslim com-
munities, spatial claims in Addis Ababa are clearly visible and have
drawn the attention of researchers such as Jon Abbink () and
Patrick Desplat (Desplat & Schulz ). Most of the work on Islam
and its presence in the public space is analysed by positing that
Muslim communities are in opposition to Christian communities. This
article complements this research by investigating in particular the
agency and counter-agency of Muslim communities in relation to the
Ethiopian government, and the ways in which the latter reinforces its
power and control over the urban space. By government strategies
such as putting the Majlis and other mosques under government
control; closing schools, mosques and newspapers ofﬁces; deliberately
leaving Muslim religious constructions in informal and illegal condi-
tions; or publicly presenting Muslims as extremists, Muslims lose
control over their most important assets of representation in the
urban public space. State interference is routine in Addis Ababa’s
public life, but different examples demonstrate how, despite the
strong state control over public urban space, Muslim communities not
only ‘break’ or ‘breach’ into this urban space, but also achieve a
certain extent of public visibility in the city, through infrastructure, prac-
tices and discourses. From the government side, apart from strategies of
repression and censorship, the EPRDF also responds to Muslim spatial
agency by counter-initiatives which attempt to reclaim the urban
space. Through its ‘counter-radicalisation’ discourse, the Ethiopian gov-
ernment has shifted from mediating inter-religious conﬂicts to regulat-
ing religious practice, in which it increasingly adopts an anti-Islamic
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discourse (International Crisis Group ). Emerging from brutal gov-
ernment interference and from Muslim polemic messages, the urban
landscape of Addis Ababa has become a vibrant arena of intimidation
and confrontation. Urban public spaces are being made and unmade
as part of political strategies of presence and dominance.
All over the world, spatial translations of ethnic or religious tensions
turn cities into fragmented landscapes. Competing claims between gov-
ernments and religious communities over the control of urban public
space are manifest in very different settings. Sensitive debates over the
recognition and construction of Islamic schools and mosques in
various cities of Western Europe present a clear example. Political
crisis over the balance between religious freedom and the principles
of the secular state yields intense debates that inﬂuence urban and
national planning policies (Uitermark et al. ; Hopkins & Gal
). These dynamics are always both locally as well as globally
inspired, and emerge from both local historical trajectories of Muslim
communities as well as from the inﬂuence of global post-/ discourses
about Islam. The current political demands of Addis Ababa’s Muslim
communities have to be understood in the context of the connection
of local Islamic movements to transnational and more political forms
of Islam. At the same time, local anti-Islamic sentiments in Addis
Ababa and the government’s acts of repression have been strongly
fuelled by the global War on Terror. Within the Horn of Africa,
Ethiopia is considered an anti-terror stronghold and an ‘ally to the
West’ (Østebø ). In this context, Ethiopia not only receives sub-
stantial foreign support to ‘ﬁght terrorism’, but also receives political
legitimisation of its regime (Feyissa Dori ; Jawar et al. ). As
has been demonstrated by many scholars in other cases, the ‘war-on-
terror’ discourse, easily manipulated and actively given shape through
the government-controlled media, proved to be a welcome means
through which the EPRDF could castigate Islam in Ethiopia and at the
same time reinforce its own power position. This has provided the
regime with a political framework that justiﬁed repressive actions
taken against Muslim communities in Addis Ababa and that led to an
increasing ‘policy of containment’ by which it has sought to extend
control over Islamist movements (Østebø ). More recent dynamics
in Ethiopia following Islamic State execution of Ethiopians in Libya, and
further debates on ISIS inﬂuences in Ethiopia, have indisputably add-
itionally reinforced the government’s repressive attitude towards
Muslim communities.
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By researching urban fragmentation from a spatial perspective, in-
vestigating the dynamic use and manipulation of the urban material,
discursive and performative landscape, this paper offers an original con-
tribution to the current debates on the conﬁguration of political iden-
tities and public authority in urban Ethiopia. It has demonstrated how
the urban landscape is a site of regulation and control, and how the
closer analysis of interventions in this landscape by all actors involved
in the struggle for control and dominance can provide insights into
the ways in which power and authority are locally produced.
N O T E S
. In this article, talking about Muslim communities (in plural), we refer to the multitude of dif-
ferent Islamic groups and fractures that exist in Addis Ababa today. However, as an analytical cat-
egory, we present them as one in their more or less uniﬁed struggle to counter EPRDF’s strategies
to control them. Cross-movement actions have been the norm for Ethiopian Muslims in their
approach on the government.
. Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front.
. Communist regime which took power in Ethiopia after the revolution in  and which was
overthrown in .
. Ethiopian government, ‘Proclamation No. : the constitution of the federal Democratic
Republic of Ethiopia’, , p. .
. Christians did not regain their previous position as religion of the state. The new secular state
remained free from direct religious political involvement and took active steps to maintain the sep-
aration of state and religion.
. Restrictions on the Hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca) were abolished and religious literature could
from then on be exported and imported freely (Østebø ).
. To a certain extent this study builds on the extensive work done by Jon Abbink on state-reli-
gious relations in Ethiopia (Abbink , a, b).
. For an overview of the most important trends of the ‘spatial turn’ in studies of Islam and
Muslim communities: see Desplat & Schulz ().
. Also inspired by the work of FionaWilliamson () on the locality of political agency and the
insights of Michel Foucault () on the intersection between space, power and social practice.
. Other case studies have beautifully demonstrated the importance of materiality in religious
communities’ experience of marginalization and oppression (Larkin ; Graham ; Hart
).
. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gSxGOSy>, national census of : ,. These
numbers, however, have strongly been contested by the Ethiopian Muslim communities (Abink
: ).
. For an overview of the history of Islam in Ethiopia: see Hussein (, ) and Feyissa Dori
(). Although today more united than before (in their common ‘struggle’ against the Ethiopian
Government) the Ethiopian Muslim communities are not without internal fragmentation. See for
example Østebø (), Abbink (), Feyissa Dori () on the tensions between ‘mainstream’
and ‘radical’ Islamic movements.
. Interview with Muslim professor at the Department of Languages, Addis Ababa University
(..).
. This however does not mean that these boroughs or sub-cities are religiously homogeneous.
. Interview with Muslim professor at Human Rights Department of Addis Ababa University
(..). Interview with Muslim reporter and author of two books on mosques in Addis Ababa
(..).
. The expansion of Salaﬁst movements is increasingly creating tensions within the Muslim com-
munity (Interview with reporter and cameraman ..).
 J E P S T O C K M A N S A N D K A R E N B Ü S C H E R
available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X1600077X
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. Universiteit Gent, on 08 Mar 2017 at 08:45:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
. Østebø (); Interview with a Christian researcher working on minority groups in Ethiopia
including Ethiopian Muslims (..).
. This distrust by the local Muslim community as well as by the Muslim Ethiopian diaspora can
be read from the following blog: <http://blog.ethiopianmuslims.net/?p=>, consulted
... See also Abbink (a).
. During one of these training sessions, around  people were arrested after dropping out,
which suggests that this campaign was not always attended voluntarily (Østebø ). Imams who
refused to participate in training organised in the Sandafa Military Training Camp had taken their
leadership from regional or zonal Majlis or mosques (Jawar et al. ).
. Interview with Muslim professor at Human Rights Department of Addis Ababa University
(..); Interview with Muslim employee of Institute of Ethiopian Studies (..);
Interview with Muslim professor at the Department of Anthropology, Addis Ababa University
(..).
. A detailed overview of the trajectory of different events and their underlying dynamics is pre-
sented by Jon Abbink (a: –).
. After withdrawing the licence of its main sponsor, the Saudi based Muslim World League
‘under the suspicion that they were engaged in ‘religious propaganda’’ (Abbink a: ).
. Interview with Muslim professor at the Human Rights Department of Addis Ababa University
(..).
. Interview with a Christian researcher working on minority groups in Ethiopia including
Ethiopian Muslims (..). See Abbink (a) on the organization of the protest movements
and their political demands.
. These are ﬁgures according to the World Population Review <http://worldpopulationreview.
com/countries/ethiopia-population/>. The last ofﬁcial national census dates from , with
,, inhabitants.
. According to the Addis Ababa Master Plan, ‘about a quarter of all housing units in Addis Ababa
have been built illegally and informally’ (Addis Ababa revised Master Plan Proposals: Draft summary
December , p. ).
. Ofﬁce for the revision of the Addis Ababa Master plan, Addis Ababa revised Master Plan Proposals:
Draft summary December , Addis Ababa, Addis Ababa city government (), p. .
. Jon Abbink, in his research on Muslim–Christian relations in Ethiopia, argues that religious
identities are becoming increasingly dominant as people’s primary public identity, impacting the
‘public sphere’ where religious identities are being presented and contested in a self-consciously
polemical fashion (Abbink , b).
. As Desplat has convincingly argued with regards to religious geographies and Muslim practices
of place-making, a place is at once a performative act (performed landscape) and a structuring order;
it is a medium through which social urban life is affected (Desplat ).
. Interview with a Muslim reporter and author of two books on history of mosques in Addis
Ababa (..); Interview with a Muslim professor at the Human Rights Department of Addis
Ababa University (..); Interview with a Muslim reporter and cameraman (..).
. Focus group of seven mosque participants at Anwar Mosque (..).
. Based on ﬁeld observation and informal conversations with mosque participants.
. Interview Government Ofﬁcial city planning (..). During this interview, when critical
questions were asked on the procedure of land allocation to construct mosques, the atmosphere
became increasingly tense and the translator was being threatened.
. Interview with a Muslim political scientist at Addis Ababa University, also an important ﬁgure
in the intellectualist movement (..).
. Interview with a Christian researcher working on minority groups in Ethiopia including
Ethiopian Muslims (..).
. Interview with a Muslim reporter and cameraman (..).
. The equivalent of around € ,.
. In an interview with a Muslim reporter and cameraman (..) it was mentioned that the
main person in charge of this construction was imprisoned (..).
. Muslim reporter and cameraman (..).
. Interview with Muslim reporter and cameraman (..).
. Interview with a Muslim reporter and cameraman (..).
. This deployment of security services strongly increased after the wave of demonstrations in
, see footnote .
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. Interview with a Muslim political scientist at Addis Ababa University, also an important ﬁgure
in the intellectualist movement (..).
. Interview with a business man (Muslim) ... Interview with Muslim reporter and cam-
eraman (..).
. Interview with a Muslim professor at the Human Rights Department of Addis Ababa University
(..); Interview with Muslim reporter and cameraman (..).
. Focus group of ﬁve female Muslim students (..).
. Focus group of ﬁve female Muslim students (..); Interview with a Muslim professor at
the Human Rights Department of Addis Ababa University (..); Interview with a Muslim
reporter and cameraman (..).
. The power of this form of spatial agency has become extremely visible during the Arab Spring
in .
. Interview with a Muslim female teacher in secondary education (..); Interview with a
Muslim professor at the Department of Anthropology of Addis Ababa University (..);
Interview with a Muslim professor at the Human Rights Department of Addis Ababa University
(//); Focus group of ﬁve female Muslim students (..).
. Interview with a Muslim professor at the Human Rights Department of Addis Ababa University
(..). Interview with a Muslim reporter and author of two books on mosques in Addis
(..).
. Interview with a Muslim female teacher in secondary education (..); Interview with a
Muslim professor at the Department of Anthropology of Addis Ababa University (..);
Interview with a Muslim professor at the Human Rights Department of Addis Ababa University
(..); Focus group of ﬁve female Muslim students (..).
. Interview with a Muslim female teacher in secondary education (..).
. Reuters: ‘Ethiopia hands lengthy prison terms to Muslim activists’ <http://www.reuters.com/
article/us-ethiopia-arrests-idUSKCNQAC> (accessed ..); Al Jazeera America:
‘Ethiopia Politicizes Courts to Strangle Dissent’ <http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions///
ethiopia-politicizes-courts-to-strangle-dissent.html> (accessed //).
. Al Jazeera America: Ethiopia Politicizes Courts to Strangle Dissent <http://america.aljazeera.
com/opinions///ethiopia-politicizes-courts-to-strangle-dissent.html> (accessed ..).
. See: ‘Let our voice be heard’ <https://www.facebook.com/DimtsachinYisemaEnglish/
photos/a...//> (accessed
..); own observations.
. See for example: <http://blog.ethiopianmuslims.net/?p=> (accessed ..).
. Blog for Ethiopian Muslims on which they can express their ideas and frustrations <http://
blog.ethiopianmuslims.net/?p=> (accessed ..).
. For more detail on early periodicals and the subject they cover, see Hussein ().
. Ethiopian Government, ‘Proclamation No. : A proclamation to provide for freedom of the
mass media and access to information‘ in Federal Negarit Gazeta, , p. . Ethiopian government,
‘Proclamation No. : the constitution of the federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia’, , p. .
. The Ethiopian Herald, ‘The need to create terrorist intolerant society’, ..; The Ethiopian
Herald, ‘Ethiopia said showing new way of solving problems with terrorism’, ..; The Ethiopian
Herald, ‘Fundamentalist force in Somalia declares intensiﬁed attacks on Ethiopia’, ..; The
Ethiopian Herald, ‘Terrorism: a menace to world peace’, ...
. See <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gSxGOSy> (accessed ..).
. The Ethiopian Herald, ‘Ethiopia said showing new way of solving problems with terrorism’,
...
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